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''One More for Luck'' 
The Destruction of U971 by HMCS 
Haida and HMS Eskimo, 
24June 1944 
Barry M. Gough and James A. Wood 
On the evening of 23 June 1944, HMCS Haida and HMS Eskimo set out from Plymouth, 
operational base of the lOth Destroyer Flotilla 
(lOth DF), to conduct a sweep of the Western 
Approaches to the English Channel. Their role 
was to assist in securing these waters for the 
ongoing delivery of supplies and reinforcements 
to the Normandy bridgehead. Across the 
Channel to the southeast, American, British and 
Canadian forces were now in their third week of 
fighting across the fields and hedgerows of 
Normandy. Operation OVERLORD had been the 
largest amphibious invasion in history and, 
dependent as it was on the unimpeded use of 
the sea, required an intensive concentration of 
air and naval forces to protect Allied supply 
convoys. This naval counterpart of OVERLORD 
was Operation NEPTUNE, and it was as part of 
this massive undertaking that Haida and 
Eskimo now steamed out of Plymouth. 
Next morning found the two Tribal-class 
destroyers patrolling calm waters north of 
Ushant. Commander Harry DeWolf, RCN, 
onboard Haida, a decorated veteran of several 
hard-fought actions in the English Channel, was 
Senior Officer of the force, while HMS Eskimo 
sailed under the capable direction of 
Lieutenant-CommanderE.N. Sinclair, RN. Since 
February, the lOth DF had been engaged in a 
running battle with German destroyers and 
torpedo boats, fighting for control of the narrow 
sea dividing Britain from Europe. Now, faced 
with the vastly superior forces of Operation 
NEPTUNE, Germany had turned to its U-boat 
fleet, and more specifically those boats recently 
fitted with schnorkel equipment. in a desperate, 
last-ditch effort to disrupt invasion convoys. 
U971 was such a boat, and earlier in June this 
VII-C class submarine, under the command of 
Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, had 
received orders to proceed from Norway to the 
English Channel. It was to be U971 's first and 
last operational mission. Plagued for the entire 
journey by Allied aircraft and equipment failures, 
by 24 June the beleaguered U-boat was fast 
approaching a fatal encounter with Haida and 
Eskimo. That evening, the survivors of U971 
would find themselves being taken aboard the 
Allied destroyers as prisoners of war after a 
somewhat exceptional encounter: "It was rare 
for Tribals to kill U-boats. Usually it was the 
other way around." 1 
The lOth Destroyer Flotilla 
H MCS Haida and HMS Eskimo were Tribal-class destroyers: technologically some of the 
most advanced naval architecture, marine 
propulsion systems and weaponry of their time. 
They were fast and heavily-gunned, veritable 
pocket cruisers designed to participate in major 
fleet engagements. Commissioned on 30 August 
1943, Haidajoined the Home Fleet destroyers 
based at Scapa Flow in September to prepare 
for her first operational assignment: protecting 
the Arctic convoys carrying urgently-needed 
supplies to the Soviet Union. Convoy operations 
in these far northern dark, cold, stormy waters 
were major fleet exercises, under constant threat 
of attack from German air and naval units based 
in Norway. This was work Haida was designed 
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Three Tribals (Haida at right) and HMS Black Prince (second from left) manoeuvre at high speed 
March 1944. Together, Tribals of the 1Oth DF and the cruiser Black Prince formed Force 26. 
for, and she won a battle honour for her part in 
the operations which witnessed the sinking of 
the German battle cruiser Scharnhorst at the 
end of December 1943. Haida was then 
reassigned to Plymouth Command in January 
1944 to prowl the English Channel. 
Haida's sister Tribal HMS Eskimo had a 
more storied wartime career. Built in 1937, she 
saw action from the earliest days of the war, 
scoring her first kill on 17 October 1939 by 
shooting down a German aircraft. She went on 
to spend the first winter of the war on convoy 
escort duties, and she later played a role in the 
highly successful Second Battle ofNarvik on 13 
April 1940. Here, Eskimo took part in the 
complete destruction of an eight-ship German 
destroyer flotilla, though in exchange she 
sustained severe torpedo damage to her bow. 
After repairs were completed, the veteran Tribal 
was redeployed to escort duties with the Home 
Fleet and later went on to help screen the Allied 
landings in North Africa and Sicily. Struck by 
fire from a German dive-bomber in this last 
operation, Eskimo returned to England for 
repairs and subsequently joined the 1Oth DF on 
26 May 1944. 
8 
The naval forces gathered under Plymouth 
Command served as guardians of the Western 
Approaches to the English Channel. In the first 
half of 1944, these hotly contested waters were 
the scene of countless nocturnal skirmishes 
between Allied naval forces, including the lOth 
DF, and surface vessels of the German 
Kriegsmarine operating out of French ports. At 
the same time, the great invasion to open a front 
in northwest Europe was scheduled for the 
spring of 1944. "When planning the Normandy 
invasion," remarks Michael Whitby, a noted 
authority on the lOth DF, "Allied naval 
commanders recognized that although 
Kriegsmarine surface forces represented only a 
limited threat to the beachhead, powerful 
destroyers based in Bay of Biscay ports could 
wreak havoc on vulnerable build-up convoys 
crossing the Channel. "2 To meet this danger, 
Plymouth Command gathered the toughest 
destroyers they could find, among them all the 
Tribals in Canadian service. 
During the spring of 1944 the lOth DF 
prowled the night waters of the Channel, 
harrying German shipping and seeking battle 
with enemy surface forces in offensive sweeps, 
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Haida and Athabaskan conducting high speed tactical exercises in the English Channel. The 1Oth DF sank 
35 surface ships, a submarine, and damaged 14 ships at the cost of losing Athabaskan on 29 April1944 
and covering Allied minelaying operations along 
the French coast.3 In both cases, explains Whitby, 
"the 'main objective' was to search out and 
destroy the enemy. The captains of the flotilla 
took [this] to heart, and this certainly 
contributed to the aggressiveness, at times 
verging on recklessness, that characterized the 
flotilla's subsequent operations. "4 This was 
Tribal warfare at its best, and Haida excelled at 
it. In her first direct encounter with the enemy 
on the night of 25-26 April 1944 Haida and 
HMCS Athabaskan shared in the destruction 
of the small destroyer T-29: the first enemy 
surface vessel sunk by the Royal Canadian Navy. 5 
The Germans got revenge a few nights later 
when, in pursuit of two other Elbing class 
destroyers, Athabaskan was rocked by "two 
definite explosions, one light, one heavy- almost 
simultaneously"6 and sunk. Losing sight of one 
Elbing, Haida turned her guns against the 
second. With rounds impacting along the length 
ofT-27, a fire broke out behind the forward gun, 
blinding the bridge. Ablaze, and with few options 
remaining, T-27 was run hard aground to avoid 
sinking: Haida's second victory. Harry DeWolf 
was awarded the Distinguished Service Order 
for gallantry in action and in recognition of the 
fact that in two consecutive actions, Haida had 
destroyed an enemy destroyer. This feat was 
unequaled in Plymouth Command, and spoke 
to the power ofTribals in surface actions when 
driven hard by gifted captains. 
The First Patrol of U971 
~ough commissioned over a year earlier on 
~ 1 April 1943, at the time of the Allied 
landings in Normandy U971 was still considered 
a new boat, having yet to set out on its first 
operational patrol. Built in Hamburg by Blohm 
& Voss, U971 was a VII-C class U-boat, an 
exceptionally seaworthy, maneuverable, and 
reliable craft. Like all VII-C U-boats, U971 was 
built to be a workhorse, with a range of 8,500 
miles at 10 knots on the surface. Originally 
designed to accommodate a crew of 44, U971 
was considerably more crowded in June 1944, 
having brought additional men onboard to 
service new anti-aircraft (AA) guns that were 
installed on all VII-C boats in the later stages of 
the war. The average age of the crewmen was 
approximately 21, and most of the men were 
inexperienced submariners. 7 The captain of 
U971, Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, was 
25 years old. Under different circumstances, his 
first set of orders would likely have sent him off 
to join the wolfpacks in the North Atlantic. As it 
happened, in the spring of 1944 U971 sailed 
from Kiel to Kristiansand, at the southern tip of 
Norway, there to be held in readiness against 
the possibility of an Allied invasion of that 
country. The deception of Operation 
FORTITUDE had been a success: as late as June 
1944, the Germans remained uncertain as to 
whether the upcoming invasion would take place 
in the Pas de Calais, Normandy, or Norway. 8 
9 
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Tribal Class Destroyer Type VII-C U-Boat 
Manufacturer Haida -Vickers Armstrong, Newcastle U971 - Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Eskimo -V. A. Parsons, 'JYne 
Displacement 1960 tons standard 769 tons surfaced 2745 tons full load 871 tons submerged 
Length 355.5 ft (Eskimo); 377ft (Haida) 220.5 feet 
Beam 37. 5 feet 20.3 feet 
Draft 13 feet full load 15.4 feet 
36 knots surface: max. 17 knots. avg. 10 knots, Performance (32.5 full load) submerged: 7.6 knots for 1 hour, twin AEG 750 hp electric motors 
Crew 238-259 44 ( + additional crew brought onboard to 
service new AA guns) 
• 3 twin mounting 4.7-inch guns 
• 1 AA gun- 3.5-inch (later- 37 mm) 
• 1 twin 4-inch gun -high angle 
• 2 AA guns - 20 mm 
• 1 2-pdr quad Pom-Pom 
• 14 torpedoes- 21-inch. 4 tubes forward, Armament • 6 20 mm twin Oerlikons 1 aft 
• 4 21-inch torpedoes 
• 2 Depth Charge throwers- I 0 Mk VII DC in • 1 deck gun - 88 mm 
position, 22 on deck. 24 between decks 
• 8 Canadian Tribals - 4 built in Halifax & • 568 commissioned 1940- 1945, capable 
4 built in UK of diving to periscope depth in 30 seconds 
• 16 British & 3 Australian Triba1s and a maximum dive depth to 722 feet. 
• "magnificent in appearance, majestic in • Range of 8500 miles at 1 0 knots on 
Characteristics movement, menacing in disposition." surface. medium sized, very manoeuvrable, 
• Tribals were technologically advanced reliable and exceptionally seaworthy 
ships in weaponry. propulsion, and 
structure 
Operation Neptune 
A s of 6 June 1944, both Plymouth Command and the German U-boat arm found 
themselves under new orders in response to the 
invasion. Both sides understood that the success 
of Overlord depended upon the ability of the 
Allies to transport vast quantities of men and 
materiel across the Channel. D-Day was the 
greatest seaborne assault of all time and required 
an armada of vessels, all gathered together under 
the auspices of Operation NEPTUNE. In the first 
forty-eight hours of the invasion, slow-moving 
transport vessels were scheduled to land 
150,000 men and 1,500 tanks over a 50-mile 
stretch of the Norman coast, with a million men 
and several million tons of materiel to follow in 
the weeks ahead. 11 
To counter the long-anticipated invasion, the 
Germans relied on their land forces and coastal 
fortifications, supplemented, with any luck, by 
the 230 Kriegsmarine surface vessels stationed 
in France and some 130 U-boats stationed along 
the Bay of Biscay and in Norway. 12 While U -boats 
could be deployed only with great difficulty amid 
the shallow depths and unpredictable cross-tides 
of the Channel, they posed a significant threat 
10 
• most famous VII-C was U96 featured in 
the movie "Das Boot" 
should the Germans decide to mount a 
determined offensive. 
NEPTUNE's planners did not underestimate 
the enemy. To counter the threat of a German 
naval offensive in the Channel, both flanks of 
the sea-lanes to Normandy required a screen of 
warships and patrol aircraft. In the western 
Channel, this task fell to Plymouth Command, 
and to the destroyers of the lOth DF. It was 
expected that the Germans would use their 
sixteen destroyers at Brest, Cherbourg and along 
the Bay of Biscay to disrupt the invasion convoys 
as they crossed the English Channel. However, 
a more serious threat was posed by the U-boats, 
with one worst-case scenario put forward by the 
Admiralty's Anti-U-boat Division speculating that 
a loss of 240 ships per week was not outside 
the realm of possibility. 13 Therefore, Escort 
Groups composed of escort destroyers, frigates 
and other smaller vessels- the anti-submarine 
specialists of the North Atlantic war with the 
latest in A/S sensors and weaponry - were 
established to protect convoys from U-boat 
attacks and to hunt them down as they 
approached. The heavier-armed Tribals of the 
lOth DF stood ready to counter German surface 
vessels should they attempt to interfere with the 
anti-submarine specialists. 
4
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Operation NEPTUNE- 6 June 1944 
Commander DeWolf, in his Report of 
Proceedings for June 1944, described Haida's 
work at the time of the invasion: 
The Flotilla's invasion role was that of Covering 
Force in the Western Channel to protect the 
invasion convoy routes from attack by enemy 
surface vessels. The Flotilla continued to operate 
directly under the orders of 
Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth and in effect 
little change of routine resulted directly from the 
invasion. With the arrival in the Channel of the 
numerous A/S Escort Groups, to counter the 
U-boat threat, the scope of the Flotilla's patrol 
was extended to provide cover for those groups 
operating near the enemy coast. 14 
It was while screening the western approaches 
to the Channel that Haida and HMCS Huron 
shared in Haida's third surface kill when, on 
the night of 9 June, they became engaged in the 
largest purely naval action of Operation 
NEPTUNE. During the battle between the lOth 
DF and a flotilla of three large German 
destroyers, Haida and Huron engaged the 
powerful Narvik class Z-32, scoring a hit that 
put the port engine out of commission. Another 
three hits destroyed one of the ship's forward 
gun mountings. For three hours they chased 
Z-32, scoring repeated hits until finally a shot 
from one of the Canadian Tribals shut down the 
Narvik's starboard engine. With escape now 
impossible, the burning Z-32 was run aground 
on the rocks oflle de Batz. DeWolfwas awarded 
the Distinguished Service Cross for the night's 
action. The Tribals had destroyed two German 
warships and extensively damaged two others: 
losses the enemy could not afford with an 
invasion bridgehead now established on the 
mainland of northwest Europe. Moreover, Haida 
established herself the pre-eminent destroyer in 
the Channel, and DeWolf as a master of night 
surface actions. 
U-971 Sets Out for the Channel 
Even as the lOth Destroyer Flotilla celebrated the removal of one threat from the Channel, 
a second set out from Norway to take its place. 
On 6 June, a wireless signal arrived at 
11 
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Kristiansand announcing the Anglo-American 
landings in France, followed two days later by 
U971 's new orders: proceed on the surface into 
the North Sea. Zeplien received a second signal 
on 1 0 June directing him to set course for the 
Atlantic via the Rosengarten off the Shetlands. 
These were dangerous waters for a U-boat, 
particularly given the low clouds and bad 
visibility - conditions favouring Allied patrol 
aircraft. 15 Initially steering as directed, Zeplien 
decided his present course was too dangerous 
after sighting Allied aircraft and ordered U971 
The next signal Zeplien received ordered 
U971 and four other U-boats to proceed to an 
area of operations in the English Channel 
between Plymouth and Ushant. It was to be a 
passage beset by difficulties. On 13 June one of 
his acoustic T5 torpedoes developed a 
malfunction and had to be jettisoned. The next 
morning the U -boat was forced to submerge after 
being pursued by a ship that Zeplien suspected 
was summoning attack aircraft. Passing near the 
Faeroes on 15 June, U971 was sighted while fully 
surfaced and attacked by a British Sunderland, 
----~-
A Type VII-C U-Boat entering a French Biscay harbour. U971 was a type VII-C, known as the 
workhorse of the Unterseebootwaffe. Shown here is U96, featured in the movie Das Boot. 
onto a new heading that would pass only a few 
miles north of the Faeroes. 
Just as the orders given to Haida and 
Eskimo were now dictated by the requirements 
of the D-Day invasion, so too were those of 
U-971. Admiral Donitz's unequivocal order of 
June 11 to his U-boat commanders reflected the 
urgency of the situation in the Channel: 
12 
The invasion fleet is to be attacked with complete 
recklessness .... When it is necessary to get to 
grips with the enemy landing fleet, there is no 
question of any regard to danger through shallow 
water or possible minefields or reservations of 
any kind .... AU-boat which inflicts losses on the 
enemy during landing has discharged its highest 
duty and justified its existence, even if it does 
not survive. 16 
but was able to return fire with flak armament 
and force the aircraft to turn away. 
Zeplien's second encounter with patrol 
aircraft did not turn out so well. On 20 June, 
Coastal Command aircraft attacked the surfaced 
U-boat, this time while it was passing south of 
Ireland. On this occasion, a Leigh Light-equipped 
Wellington bomber of 407 (RCAF) Squadron, 
piloted by Flying Officer Frederick H. Foster, 
attacked with depth charges and inflicted 
damage to three of the four bow torpedo tubes. 
Flying over the stricken U971, the Wellington's 
rear-gunner also reported further damage to the 
target after seeing some of the 400 rounds from 
his gun ricocheting off the hull. 17 The following 
day, on 21 June, a Sunderland of 228 (RAF) 
Squadron and a Halifax bomber of 502 (RAF) 
6
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Squadron, machine gunned U971, with the 
Halifax also managing to drop a pattern of four 
depth charges that fell wide of the target by only 
63 feet. 18 Zeplien's green crew was quickly 
learning why Allied aircraft were both feared and 
despised by the U-boats. 
Following the attack, the captain of U971 
decided that aircraft cover was too strong and 
again shifted his course. On 22 June he tested 
his torpedo tubes, not knowing the full extent of 
the damage. He discovered that only two tubes 
remained serviceable. That same day he received 
a signal stating that the most important area of 
operations for U971 and the other four U -boats 
was off the coast near Cherbourg. Noting the 
urgency of this signal, Zeplien set course for that 
area using his schnorkel. 19 This device, 
essentially an intake and exhaust valve, allowed 
U-boats to continue operating diesel engines 
while travelling at periscope depth, thereby 
avoiding detection by Allied aircraft and radar, 
though at a cost of reduced visibility and speed. 
In the early morning hours of 24 June, while 
schnorkelling, U971 sighted two destroyers, one 
dead ahead and the other off the port bow, both 
at a range of about 2,000 yards. Seizing upon 
this opportunity, Zeplien manoeuvred to fire a 
torpedo from the stern tube, only to discover 
that it could not be released. Instead, the torpedo 
"ran 'hot' -its propeller started running but the 
torpedo did not eject from the tube, a situation 
terrifying to submariners."2° Coming about for 
a second attempt, Zeplien attempted to fire an 
acoustic T -5 torpedo from Tube II, his only 
working bow tube, but this too failed to fire. Both 
destroyers then disappeared into the mist as the 
crew of U971 undoubtedly cursed their boat, 
loaded as it was with equipment that never 
seemed to work. Three of the torpedo tubes were 
damaged beyond use and an attempt at firing 
the remaining two had resulted in two misfires. 
One of the officers later reported that even the 
head was broken, recalling that "at 0600 the boat 
surfaced to dump fecal matter overboard as the 
toilets were defective. "21 
Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, on his 
first operational mission in command of U971, 
at this point made the decision that it was 
hopeless to continue operating in this area 
without repairs. While U971 was surfaced to 
clear the defective toilets, Zeplien signaled that 
14 
he was putting into Brest, approximately 30 
miles to the west. U971 was running on the 
surface. At 0615 hours an aircraft was sighted 
but, perhaps not surprisingly, neither the 37 mm 
nor the 20 mm would fire and U971 dived. At 
0730 hours, the U-boat was again brought to 
the surface to proceed at full speed towards 
Brest, but within twenty minutes another aircraft 
was sighted. Again U971 was forced to crash 
dive, this time to a depth of about 400 feet. Since 
daybreak, Zeplien had brought his vessel to the 
surface on two occasions and both times been 
spotted by enemy aircraft within 15 to 20 
minutes. Given the intensity of Allied air cover, 
running below the surface using schnorkel 
seemed out of the question- even if the enemy 
missed the wake of the schnorkel itself, the diesel 
engines still produced black clouds of exhaust-
and continuing along the surface without 
anti-aircraft armament would be suicidal. 
U971's best option at this point was to 
remain submerged and use batteries, but then, 
"after proceeding for about one mile toward 
Brest, the batteries failed. Zeplien realized that 
his only hope of escape was to proceed surfaced 
under cover of darkness into Brest. He ordered 
the men into their bunks and all hands were 
issued with potash cartridges. "22 Intending to 
rest on the ocean floor until after sundown before 
making a break on the surface for Brest, there 
was to be no sleep for the crew of U971. Within 
less than an hour, at 0830 hours, an Asdic 
signature was noted by a passing Allied vessel 
and a series of depth charge attacks commenced. 
Leutnant zur See Helmut Buchholz, Second 
Watch Officer of U971, later reported that these 
attacks continued all day, every 20 minutes, 
always with 12 bombs.23 
The Attack: Haida and Eskimo 
"Roar off to the Spot" 
On 23 June, Haida, in company with Eskimo, swept inside the Channel Isles in support 
of the Light Coastal Forces operating offSt-Malo, 
returning to the area off Land's End the next 
morning. At 0848 hours Plymouth ordered the 
two Tribals to proceed south across the Channel. 
With DeWolf acting as Senior Officer, their new 
task was to act in support of the Captain F.J. 
Walker's famous U -boat killers the 2nd Escort 
Group by ensuring that German destroyers did 
not attempt to interfere with their 
8
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anti-submarine sweep. It took the Trtbals nearly 
four hours to make the crossing, and upon their 
arrival Haida received a signal from Captain 
Walker that aU-boat had recently been sighted 
by aircraft northwest of U shant. 24 
While the 2nd Escort Group was conducting 
its search, the two Tribals established their 
patrol line to the north, zig-zagging in line abreast 
at 25 knots. It was a calm, cloudless day, with 
minutes later. With the celebrated U-boat killer, 
Captain Johnny Walker, only a few miles off, 
DeWolf signalled the 2nd Escort Group: "We have 
a submarine here, would you like to take over?'' 
"No," came the reply, "go ahead and get on with 
it."28 DeWolf also notified other Escort Groups 
in the area of the situation, expecting the A/ S 
specialists to take over as soon as possible. 
DeWolf was keenly aware that Tribals were not 
RAF Photograph of Haida making good speed off the coast of England, 1944. Haida and Eskimo were Tribal-class 
destroyers, noted as fast, versatile, heavily-gunned ships that inspired their officers and men with pride. 
excellent visibility, and at 1545 hours both ships 
reported sighting a Liberator some 5 miles 
astern dropping depth charges or bombs. 
Moments earlier, Flying Officer Jan Vella of 311 
(Czech) Squadron RAF had sighted the periscope 
of aU-boat on the surface at 49 00' N, 05 40' W 
-approximately half-way across the Channel 
between Ushant and Land's End. Vella engaged 
the enemy with rockets and depth charges and 
dropped a smoke float to mark the U-boat's last 
position. 25 The Liberator then turned away to 
attack a second periscope that had appeared 
nearby, again using rockets and depth charges. 26 
According to DeWolf, a report of aU-boat on 
the surface was welcome news, "so we roared 
off to that spot." He continued, "We couldn't talk 
to the Czech, we couldn't understand him and 
he couldn't understand us, but we did get the 
messages he was sending to the Admiralty. "27 By 
the time Haida and Eskimo had arrived on the 
scene, the Liberator had lost contact with the 
target- U971 . 
"One More for Luck" 
Qoth Haida and Eskimo reduced speed to 7 
.L.lknots in order to facilitate their asdic search. 
Eskimo was the first ship to detect the 
submarine, with Haida obtaining contact a few 
properly equipped for and had no real 
experience with hunting U-boats. At this point, 
it even seemed likely that the target had managed 
to escape and that Haida and Eskimo were now 
pursuing a false contact. Nevertheless, the two 
Tribals continued "the hunt, pending the arrival 
of EG 15. When the latter heard that two fleet 
class destroyers [Tribals) were attacking an 
immobile target that seemed to be on the bottom, 
they left Haida and Eskimo to pursue their own 
folly. "29 This is the view of Marc Milner. 
Signalman George Mannix later recalled: 
Cdr DeWolf decided to abandon this 
questionable pursuit and carry on with his 
ordered Tunnel Operation. At this, the normally 
mild mannered and controlled A/S team, 
... Lieutenant John Coates and ... Chief Petty 
Officer John Lipton, rushed to the bridge in high 
excitement and insisted on further prosecution 
of the echo, convinced they had a sub. So DeWolf 
revised his decision and soon the team gained 
contact with the sub at about 1600, drifting with 
the current just clear of the bottom. 30 
From 1626 hours to 1825 hours the two ships 
carried out nine complete depth charge attacks, 
seven of them by Eskimo. By 1749 hours, eight 
of these patterns had been dropped. Although 
no visible results from the attacks could be 
discerned at first, it was believed that the 
submarine could still be lurking somewhere in 
15 
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of 
the immediate area. At 1803 hours, after almost 
two hours of attacking, DeWolf signalled to 
Eskimo: "Will drop one more pattern for luck."31 
This final barrage came at 1825 hours. 
Now the cat and mouse waiting game had 
begun. The depth of water here was 250 feet, 
hardly enough for the U-boat to make a deep 
dive, and she could only lie quietly on the ocean 
floor. Earlier that afternoon, after more than 
seven hours of depth-charging, Zeplien had 
decided to ascend to periscope depth, probably 
looking for an opportunity to replenish U971 's 
air supply. Instead, he had been attacked by an 
16 
Allied aircraft, suffering further damage in the 
process, and forced to crash dive to the bottom. 
At this point, "the likely course of action for a 
U -boat being hunted was to bottom and lie 'with 
the tide' (bow resting on the bottom and stern 
pointing down the direction of the tide stream) 
no more than 2-4,000 yards from its would-be 
target. This trick is what U971 played on Haida 
and Eskimo. "32 Lying on the bottom, particularly 
close inshore and affected by tides, Zeplien knew 
that U971 would present a difficult target, as 
asdic echoes bounced in all directions, 
complicated by schools of fish, rock ledges, and 
differences in salinity from fresh-water run-off. 
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Under these circumstances, according to Harry 
DeWolf: "I thought- well, the Channel here is 
full of wrecks, so we're probably bombarding 
wrecks on the bottom and we'll go on doing that 
till we give up or we've already destroyed the 
submarine and it's on the bottom. "33 Thus, by 
1825 hours, he was ready to call an end to the 
hunt and decided to carry out one last attack. 
Unknown to Haida and Eskimo, their "one 
more pattern for luck" caused the situation 
aboard U971 to deteriorate rapidly. "The first 
water entry occurred at 1830 hours through the 
stern glands, and shortly afterwards water came 
through the vents to diving tank No.3. "34 Repairs 
were quickly made, but it goes without saying 
that by this point the crew was getting very 
nervous. Now in their eleventh hour of 
intermittent depth charging since the first attack 
that morning, by 1830 hours the crew of U971 
had endured the last two hours under 
near-constant bombardment by the two 
destroyers above, who as yet were showing no 
sign of giving up until the job was done. It was 
to be a hunt to exhaustion, and the strain was 
beginning to take its toll on Zeplien and his crew. 
For almost an hour after the last depth 
charge attack was completed, Haida lay still in 
the water, listening for any indication of the 
submerged U-boat. At the same time, Eskimo 
had lost contact with the target, and was quietly 
conducting a slow-speed search. As they waited, 
Haida's crew undoubtedly thought back to a few 
weeks before when a torpedo that seemed to 
come out of nowhere had slammed into their 
sister-ship, Athabaskan. To make matters 
worse, by this time the Czech Liberator's report 
of a second periscope in the area had probably 
been translated by headquarters and 
retransmitted in English. 
Desperate Action and 
Lightning Response 
T ]"971 was running out of options. The 
U batteries were dead and it seemed decidedly 
unlikely that a working torpedo could be found 
anywhere on the boat. Air quality was poor, with 
just enough left to surface. 35 According to later 
testimony by the prisoners, at this point "the 
Captain made up his mind that escape was 
unlikely, further depth charging too awful to 
contemplate, and that the only thing to do was 
to surface and save his crew."36 He explained the 
plan to the officers and men while standing 
knee-deep in the water of the control room and 
finishing off the last of U971 's beer ration. After 
ordering all secret gear and papers destroyed, 
at 1900 hours Zeplien thanked the crew for their 
loyalty and ordered the ballast tanks blown. 
U971 then began a rapid rise to the surface. 
Depth charge explosion off stern of Haida. After Eskimo and Haida launched eight depth charge attacks against U971, 
Commander DeWolf decided upon "one more for luck" at 1825 hours. This final barrage was the only one causing real 
damage, forcing the U-boat to surface. 
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View from Haida 24 June 1944 after destruction of U971. Eskimo stands 
by as a motor boat from Haida goes to rescue the remaining 
six U-boat survivors, including the captain, Zeplien. 
Haida and Eskimo were in the final stages 
of preparing another depth charge attack when 
the asdic officer reported to DeWolf that the 
submarine was blowing tanks and coming up 
rapidly. U971 then broke the surface some eight 
hundred yards off Haida's port bow. At this, 
Haida's gunners burst into immediate action, 
bringing the forward "B" gun mounting onto the 
target and opening fire. Al Warner, a rating from 
Haida, recalled the scene: 
18 
The submarine was almost between us and the 
Eskimo, and she [Eskimo] went full astern to 
back up when the boys opened up wiih the 20 
mm. "B" gun was fully manned at this time, and 
when the submarine surfaced they depressed 
the gun to fire at the submarine. We were cruising 
with the guns elevated at 45 degrees, 
anti-submarine positions, "A" gun off to 
starboard, "B" gun to port. The sub was so close 
[200 yards] they had to depress "A" gun so "B" 
wouldn't hit the barrels. That gave Eskimo time 
to back up before we opened fire. The first salvo 
hit the sub; the second, too. That's all "B" gun 
fired. Two salvoes, four hits. 37 
As DeWolf described it: "a hit was obtained 
on the conning tower, with the second salvo. High 
explosive was used and penetrated the conning 
tower, starting a fire, the flames being clearly 
visible through the hole made."38 The enemy 
could offer no resistance. "B" mounting and 
small arms fire was quickly checked once it 
became apparent that the enemy did not intend 
to fight. 
The U-boat lay awash. Men were coming up 
on deck and jumping over the side. As the crew 
began to abandon ship, both Haida and Eskimo 
closed for boarding and lowered their whalers 
in an attempt to reach the stricken submarine 
before it went down. Any chance of capturing 
the U-boat intact, however, or recovering secret 
documents or equipment quickly disappeared: 
12
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the damage inflicted by Haida's gunnery was 
lethal. The submarine capsized and quietly 
slipped beneath the waves of the Channel. 
Although small explosions were later heard, it 
seems likely that U971 was destroyed by gunfire 
rather than by the scuttling charges set by the 
crew.39 U971 was lost at 1917 hours, at 49 01'N 
05 35'W, northwest ofUshant. "Three hours of 
depth charging and three minutes of gunfire had 
ended her story, the first bringing her to the 
surface and the second sending her smashed to 
the bottom. "40 
The task of rescuing the German crewmen 
was then set upon, with fifty-two of the fifty-three 
officers and men being recovered, 46 taken 
onboard Eskimo while Haida screened, and the 
other six taken into Haida. Of the survivors, six 
were injured, three seriously, including one 
rating who had been shot through the hand a 
few days earlier during one of the air attacks. 
Another casualty, having suffered a wound to his 
leg, probably caused by a 20mm round from the 
Oerlikons, was given an emergency blood 
transfusion. While this was going on, there also 
seems to have been some tough-talk by the 
prisoners, as Haida rating Warner continued: 
I understand, also, that when the survivors were 
picked up and taken aboard our ship, one of 
them asked if this was the G-63. We said yes. He 
says, "Well, you have the other ship [Eskimo] to 
thank for your lives." They'd pinpointed us and 
were goin' to let go their torpedoes, but when 
they scanned the surface and saw the Eskimo 
they knew that if they torpedoed us, the Eskimo 
was right there; they'd be dead within an hour. 
They were lookin' out for themselves. 41 
This is all assuming, of course, that a working 
torpedo could be located somewhere in U971. 
The destruction of U971 exemplified Harry 
DeWolfs actions in the English Channel. His 
determination to stay with the action, his 
aggressiveness and good fortune often paid off. 
A true leader, he had listened to his officers when 
they urged him to stay with the chase, even 
though it could not be certain that the target 
remained in the area. It was the last depth charge 
pattern, dropped "for luck" at 1825, that caused 
the final damage and forced U971 to the 
surface.42 
Reflections on the 
Destruction of U971 
Once the rescue was complete and the whalers recovered, Haida accompanied Eskimo to 
Falmouth, arriving at 0300 on 25 June 1944. 
Here, the prisoners from U971 were sent ashore 
for internment before the two Tribals returned 
to Plymouth. Passing the harbour gate, Haida 
received a signal from Black Prince: "Elbings, 
Narviks, and submarines all seem to come alike 
to you." To this DeWolf replied that it was just 
Saturday recreation for the crew. 43 
Survivors of U971 Awaiting Rescue, 24 June 1944. Eskimo took 46 prisoners onboard as Haida screened. 
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Later assessments of the attack on the 
U-boat contained comments in regards to future 
anti-submarine work with Tribal-class 
destroyers. The commander of Eskimo stated: 
In spite of this success I am strongly of the 
opinion that Tribals should not engage in 
prolonged A/ S work. An Escort Group should 
take over at the first possible opportunity. I think 
it is reasonable to sit on a contact for a short 
period, but early relief by the proper A/S ships 
from Escort Groups is most desirable. Though 
this success adds to the variety of the 1Oth 
Flotilla's bag, and is a feather in our cap, it 
should not be taken as too strong an 
encouragement to go after U-boats when so many 
better equipped vessels are available.44 
Commander Sinclair went on to capture the 
spirit of the moment by adding to his report on 
the sinking of U971: "though it does show that 
such good opportunities must be taken without 
hesitation when they occur." Herein lay a special 
strength of DeWolf as Senior Officer. He had 
seized control of an unanticipated situation, 
resulting in pragmatic and persistent teamwork 
alongside Eskimo. An expert in the use of 
Haida's main armament, he had on this occasion 
made effective use of anti-submarine equipment 
even though Tribals are not sub-hunters, but 
20 
Captain of HMCS Haida Commander H. G. DeWolf. 
Awarded the Distinguished Service Cross three times as 
well as the Distinguished Service Order, DeWolf is 
Canada's most renowned fighting sailor. He had the Nelson 
touch: the desire 'to engage the enemy more closely'. 
rather, designed for surface action. The 
versatility of Tribal destroyers, the two 
commanders and their crews, along with the 
repeated practice of lOth DF had all paid off in 
the destruction of U971. 
In contrast, U971 began running short on 
luck in the early stages of its command. Some 
of Zeplien's decisions have been questioned. In 
Eskimo's "Information Obtained from 
Prisoners," for example, it is stated that none of 
the crew interviewed could explain why the 
German submarine was running on the surface 
during daylight hours of 24 June. The report 
indicates that "the crew were quite mystified as 
to why it was necessary - they did not think it 
was, in fact, necessary at all." However, in an 
account of the sinking, Second Watch Officer 
Helmut Buchholz stated that U971 had been 
obliged to surface to empty holding tanks and 
clear out foul air. Although the U-boat had been 
fitted with a schnorkel in April of 1944,45 there 
were several reasons why Zeplien had chosen 
to run on the surface. Given the damage suffered 
in repeated attacks, he had decided to make 
speed on the surface to Brest. Using the 
schnorkel, he would have had to contend with 
reduced visibility and speed. Further, given the 
clear visibility on 24 June, the wake produced 
by a schnorkel on calm seas and the diesel 
exhaust would not likely have gone unnoticed 
by Allied patrol vessels and aircraft. 
In Eskimo's report of the sinking, Sinclair 
called Zeplien's actions "stupid" for remaining 
stationary after being spotted by the Liberator. 
He stated that it would have been a much more 
difficult operation had Zeplien used different 
tactics. 46 Buchholz, on the other hand, stated, 
"Since a silent running was not possible due to 
damage to the rear shaft drive, the boat was set 
on the seabed." The extent of the damages 
suffered by U971 over the course of her journey 
had left her without essential weapons, unable 
to proceed using battery power, and ultimately 
with a diminishing air supply. By 1900 hours 
on 24 June, Zeplien had to choose: either bring 
U971 to the surface, or die. 
Several RN and RCN decorations were 
granted as a result of this action. DeWolf and 
Sinclair were both recognized for their 
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leadership. Lipton was recommended for 
decoration and received the Distinguished 
Service Medal and Coates was Mentioned in 
Despatches "for outstanding devotion to 
duty ... during a hunt which resulted in the 
destruction of an enemy submarine. "47 These 
were the two officers who convinced DeWolf to 
persist with the attack, even though, as DeWolf 
explained years later with classic 
understatement, "Frankly, I hadn't much 
confidence in our ability to sink the bloody thing. 
We weren't in that kind of game, we hadn't had 
any practice at it. "48 Able Seaman T.F. Cuthbert 
and Able Seaman R.H. MacLeod, operators in 
the Asdic Control Room, were Mentioned in 
Despatches. Commander Basil Jones, RN, 
Senior Officer of the lOth DF, congratulated 
DeWolffor the victory, calling it "another feather 
in Haida's Headdress"49 - a fitting tribute for a 
Tribal. On Dominion Day of 1944, Commander 
DeWolf was promoted to the rank of Captain by 
the Government of Canada. 
Mterword 
"I..]" appy Haida," was noted for h~r success 
J. l.and luck. In his memoirs, Commander 
Jones paid tribute to DeWolf: "Hard-over Harry 
was an outstanding officer, not only in skill but 
in aggressive spirit. Furthermore, he had that 
priceless gift offortune ... ofthere always being a 
target in whatever area he was told to operate. "50 
The continued good fortune of Haida, however, 
meant destruction for U971. It also led to an 
increased admiration for the versatility of the 
Tribals. While Allied Escort Groups, specifically 
trained in anti-submarine (A/S) warfare, had 
planned and practised repeatedly to keep the 
D-Day shipping lanes free from U-boat attack, 
they had been short on luck. "After nearly three 
weeks of tireless effort by the A/ S specialists 
during which they had managed to sink only one 
U -boat, the A/ S novices of the 1Oth Flotilla sank 
one on their first try."51 
The risks had been great for the crews of 
Haida, Eskimo and U971, yet only one man died 
in the encounter. It had been a relatively 
bloodless battle, especially considering the fate 
of so many other U -boat crews. By 1944, the life 
expectancy of a new U-boat had plummeted to 
almost a single patrol. On the Allied side, the 
fate of Athabaskan had already shown how close 
to the line a ship's crew could be at any time. 
The destruction of U971 illustrated the high 
degree of co-operation in the Channel among the 
ships of the RCN and RN, as well as among the 
aircraft of the RAF and RCAF. Over the course 
of nine days, U971 suffered attacks by RCAF 
422 and 407 Squadrons and by 502, 228, and 
311 (Czech) Squadrons of the RAF. HMS Eskimo 
and HMCS Haida together brought an end to 
the long pursuit. The victory had been one link 
within the massive accomplishments of 
Operation NEPTUNE. 
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